







Tests on simulated data from an asset pricing model with heterogeneous forecasts show excess
variance in the price and ARCH eﬀects in the returns, features not explained by the strong version
of the eﬃcient markets hypothesis. An evolutionary game theory dynamic describe how agents
switch between a fundamental forecast, a rational bubble forecast and the reﬂective forecast, which
is a weighted average of the former two. Conditions determining the frequency and duration of
episodes where a signiﬁcant fraction of agents adopt the rational bubble forecast leading to large
deviations in the price-dividend ratio are discussed.
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bubble1 Introduction
Though the eﬃcient markets hypothesis (EMH) has been a dominant paradigm in asset pricing
for decades, the assumption that there is a representative forecast for an asset price contradicts
the observed heterogeneity of forecasts and cannot explain important features of the data, such as
the volatility of prices and serially dependent variance in the returns. Furthermore, the strong
version of the EMH, meaning asset prices are determined solely by expectations of fundamental
information such as earnings or dividends, is at odds with the popular perception that bubbles are
a common phenomenon in asset markets.
There are models that allow for bubbles. Models of rational bubbles (Blanchard (1979), Evans
(1991)) are appealing, since expectations are rational (unbiased), and the model matches the styl-
ized fact that prices and returns are unpredictable in the short run. However, these models do
not provide an explanation for ARCH eﬀects in the returns, and it is unclear how agents could
coordinate on a forecast based on extraneous information when an alternative forecast based on
the strong EMH is available. Models with heterogenous behavioral forecasting strategies (Brock
and Hommes (1998), LeBaron (2010) etc.) can also produce large deviations in the asset price
and price-dividend ratio from the predicted values of the strong EMH, but such approaches involve
strategies do not satisfy rationality in any sense.
The present paper explains how agents with a choice of heterogeneous forecasting strategies
could adopt a rational bubble forecast leading to a bubble in the asset price. Bubbles endogenously
collapse given the assumption that a small fraction of agents do not abandon the fundamental
forecast. Furthermore, the outbreak of such bubbles can explain excess volatility in the price-
dividend ratio and ARCH eﬀects in returns, while also producing unpredictable returns.
An evolutionary game theory dynamic describes how agents switch between forecasting strate-
gies based on their past performance, given by payoﬀ based on forecast errors as in Parke and
Waters (2007, 2011). Agents choose from a fundamental forecast, which corresponds to the strong
EMH prediction, a mystic forecast, which includes an extraneous martingale as in the rational
bubble model, and a reﬂective forecast, which is a weighted average of the former two forecasts.
The reﬂective forecast embodies all the information available to the agents including the other
forecasts and their relative popularity and is the unique unbiased forecast in an environment with
1heterogeneous forecasting strategies.
The behavior of all agent satisﬁes the cognitive consistency principle, described in Evans and
Honkapohja (2011), which speciﬁes that agents in a model act are as smart as economists. More
precisely, agents should form expectations using reasonable models according to economic theory.
In the present approach, agents adopting fundamentalism and mysticism are using models that
satisfy rational expectations in the homogeneous case. While they are not fully rational in the
heterogeneous case, the vast majority of the asset pricing literature, Cochrane (2001) is a represen-
tative example, focuses on the homogeneous case. Furthermore, agents have every opportunity to
adopt reﬂectivism, a forecasting strategy that does satisfy rationality in the heterogeneous case.
The exponentially weighted replicator1 used is an example of an imitative dynamic, see Sand-
holm (2011) for a discussion, that allows for a parameterization of how aggressive agents are in
switching to strategies with superior performance. If there are no mystics in the model, the fun-
damental and reﬂective forecasts coordinate on that of the strong EMH. The key issue is to ﬁnd
conditions under which a small fractions of agents adopting mysticism can gain a following suﬃcient
to cause a signiﬁcant deviation in the price and price-dividend ratio. The introduction of a small
fraction of deviants is related to evolutionary stability commonly studied with imitative dynamics,
see Weibull (1998).
There are a number interesting alternative approaches to asset pricing that involve deviations
from the strong EMH. Commonly, some type of linear model is used to forecast prices or some other
market indicator, which satisﬁes cognitive consistency, though other restrictions on the forecast are
often required. Adam, Marcet and Niccolini (2008) are able to match a number of the features
of the U.S. stock market data where expectations of prices are formed using a simple linear model
whose parameters are updated each period. As is common in such approaches, they must impose
a projection facility to limit the possible choices of parameters in the forecasting model. Whether
the assumption that all agents know and use such an approach satisﬁes cognitive consistency is
open to interpretation.
A model of bubbles in asset markets that is not subject to this criticism is found in Branch and
Evans (2010) where a representative agent updates an estimate of the conditional variance of the
1A continuous time version of this dynamic was originally studied in Bjornerstedt and Weibull (1996) and appear
prominently in Hofbauer and Weibull (1996).
2return using a linear model. The time series implications of this approach have yet to be explored
in detail.
Another related approach with a representative agent is that of Lansing (2010), where the
forecasting model ("perceived law of motion") includes a geometric random walk, making bubbles
a possibility, but agents also update the parameter on the bubble term, so the importance of the
bubble term can change over time. This paper goes on to examine the implications of the resulting
asset price dynamics within a macroeconomic model.
The model in LeBaron (2010) has multiple forecasting strategies with a variety of linear fore-
casting models, though some agents use a "buy and hold" strategy. The gain parameter, which
parameterizes how quickly agents adjust their parameters in the model used for forecasting, varies
for the diﬀerent strategies. Agents are allowed to switch strategies according to past performance
though the mechanism is rather ad hoc.
Section 2 give details about the asset price model with heterogeneous expectation, while section
3 presents the dynamic describing the evolution of the forecasting strategies. Section 4 describes
the simulations and the conditions for the formation of bubbles. Section 5 gives the results of
formal tests on the simulated data, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Asset Pricing
This section speciﬁes the three forecasts and the resulting realization of the asset price, which
thereby determines the forecast errors for each strategy. The underlying model is the standard
asset pricing equation
pt = αpe
t+1 + dt, (1)
where the asset price is pt, the dividend is dt and the parameter α is the discount factor. This
model is not fully suﬃcient for our purpose, since there is a unique representative forecast of
the price. Brock and Hommes (1998) develop a model with mean-variance optimization where
investors choose between a riskless and risky asset in constant supply. With risk neutral agents





xh,teh,t + dt (2)
where the vectors et = (e1,t,....,en,t) and xt = (xi,t,....,xn,t) are the diﬀerent forecasts of pt+1 and
the fractions of agents using the forecasts, respectively.
The forecasts considered are motivated by the multiplicity of solution to the model (1) of the
homogeneous case. According to the strong eﬃcient markets hypothesis (EMH), the price is given
by the discounted expected future dividends as given by the following solution to the model.
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However, this solution is not unique. As discussed in the rational bubble literature, see Lansing




where the stochastic variable mt is a martingale such that mt = mt−1+ηt, for iid, mean zero shocks
ηt. Though the information contained in the martingale mt may be extraneous with respect to the
fundamental information in dt, if agents believe that information is important, it aﬀects the asset
price. Agents that adopt the forecast e3,t based on the rational bubble solution above are called







t+1) + α−t−1mt (4)
Both the mystic and fundamental forecasts satisfy rational expectations in the homogeneous
case. However, our goal is to allow for possible heterogeneity in forecasting strategies. The
reﬂective forecast e1,t is an average of the alternative forecasts used in the population weighted
according to the relative popularity.





The variable nt is the relative popularity of mysticism among agents using mysticism or reﬂectivism.
Reﬂectivism depends on alternative strategies, so to ensure its existence, we make the following
key assumption.
Assumption: The fraction of fundamentalists x2,t never falls below some minimum δ2 > 0.
This assumption is not particularly restrictive, considering that in most asset pricing models,
all investors are fundamentalists. Given these three forecasting strategies (3), (4) and (5) and the
asset pricing model allowing for heterogeneity (2), the realization of the asset price is
pt = p∗
t + α−tntmt. (6)
Agents evaluate the performance of the forecasting strategies by comparing payoﬀs based on
squared forecast errors. Hommes (2001) shows that, the mean-variance optimization underpinning
the model (2) is equivalent to minimizing squared forecast errors. Payoﬀs are deﬁned as follows.
πi,t = −(pt − ei,t−1)2 (7)
The reﬂective forecast error Ut plays an important role in the payoﬀs to all three forecasting
strategies, and is comprised of two terms.
Ut = (p∗
t − E(p∗
t)) + α−t(ntmt − nt−1mt−1) (8)
The ﬁrst term is the current period dividend payment, which is the new fundamental information.
The second term is the martingale innovation weighted according to the change in the martingale
and can be written as ntηt −∆ntmt. The representation of Ut shows that the reﬂective forecast is
unbiased, under the assumption that agents are unable to forecast changes in nt. The innovations
to the dividend (dt) and the martingale (ηt) and the change in nt are all independent, mean zero,
5so the forecast error is also mean zero and the reﬂective forecast is unbiased. The reﬂective forecast
satisﬁes rational expectations in the presence of heterogeneity.
The fundamental and mystic forecasts satisfy rationality in the homogeneous case, but their
forecast errors are aﬀected by the level of the martingale in the presence of heterogeneity. A key
term in the payoﬀs is the weighted martingale At−1 = α−tmt−1. The reﬂective forecast depends
only on Ut and, using (7) and (8), has payoﬀ
π1,t = −U2
t . (9)
Fundamentalism has forecast error Ut + nt−1At−1, so its payoﬀ is
π2,t = −U2
t − 2nt−1UtAt−1 − n2
t−1A2
t−1. (10)
Similarly, the payoﬀ to mysticism is as follows.
π3,t = −U2
t + 2(1 − nt−1)UtAt−1 − (1 − nt−1)2A2
t−1 (11)
Much of the intuition behind the possibility of mysticism gaining a following can be observed
in the above three payoﬀs. The third terms in the payoﬀs to mysticism (11) and fundamentalism
(10) are unambiguously damaging to those payoﬀs in comparison with the payoﬀ to reﬂectivism
(9). Since the covariance UtAt−1 has mean zero, in expectation, reﬂectivism outperforms the other
two strategies.
However, mysticism can outperform the other strategies in some periods. If the covariance
UtAt−1 is positive and suﬃciently large, the second term in (11) may outweigh the third term so
that π3,t > π1,t > π2,t. Such a positive covariance corresponds to a fortunate correlation between
the martingale and the innovations in the model. In distribution, dividends are uncorrelated with
the martingale, but over a number of periods, such correlations are likely to occur.
63 Evolutionary Dynamics
A generalization of the replicator dynamic, a workhorse in the evolutionary game theory literature,
describes the evolution of the vector xt of the fractions of agents using the diﬀerent forecasting
strategies. Let the weighting function w(π) be a positive, increasing function of the payoﬀs. The
general replicator dynamic2 is




where the expression wt is the weighted population average wt = x1,tw(π1,t) +       + xn,tw(πn,t).
A strategy gains followers if its weighted payoﬀ above the weighted population average, i.e. has
positive ﬁtness in evolutionary game theory terminology. Such a dynamic is said to be imitative
since strategies that are popular today, larger xi,t, tend to gain more adherents if they are successful,
i.e. the numerator in (12) is positive.
A general form for the dynamic (12) allows for a range of behavior of the agents. For a linear
weighting function w(π), the adjustment to better performing strategies is sluggish, but for convex
w(π), agents switch faster. A linear weighting function in the dynamic (12) gives the special case
of the replicator dynamic studied in Weibull (1998) and Samuelson (1998). Sandholm (2010) gives
a thorough comparison of the features of a number of evolutionary dynamics.
Using a version of the dynamic (12) with an alternate timing, Parke and Waters (2011) demon-
strate that, for bounded dividends, the payoﬀ to reﬂectivism is always above the population av-
erage. Therefore, under the replicator (linear w(π)), mysticism cannot take followers away from
reﬂectivists. While the formal details and implications of this statement are quite involved (see the
reference above) the intuition is straightforward and is relevant for the simulations using the present
approach. Under linear weighting, the covariance (second) terms in the payoﬀs to mysticism and
fundamentalism, (11) and (10), cancel in the population average payoﬀ, but the third terms with
A2
t−1 do not. Since the payoﬀ to reﬂectivism is unaﬀected by the martingale, it is larger than the
population average, so reﬂectivism gains followers.
The logic of the superiority of reﬂectivism does not apply in the case of a convex weighting
2Parke and Waters (2011) focus on a dynamic with the same form, but slightly altered timing and perform
simulations with the present form as a robustness check.
7function. Here, a positive covariance UtAt−1 > 0 has greater beneﬁt to mysticism than harm
to fundamentalism, so if it is large enough, mysticism can gain a following. The model used for
simulations focuses on the exponential weighting function
w(π) = eθ2π, (13)
so θ parameterizes the aggressiveness of the agents. An increase in θ means that agents are
switching more quickly to the best strategy, but as θ decreases the dynamic approaches the linear
weighting case. See Parke and Waters (2011) for formal results and a more detailed discussion.
One drawback to imitative dynamics such as the generalized replicator (12) is their lack of
inventiveness. If a strategy has no followers (xi = 0) then it cannot gain any. Hence, game
theorists usually focus on equilibria that are evolutionarily stable, meaning they are robust to the
introduction of a small fraction of deviating agents. Similarly, the focus of the present class of
models is whether the fundamental forecast is robust to the introduction of a small fraction of
mystics.
It is possible for mysticism to gain a following given the following conditions. Some agents
believe that extraneous information may be important to the value of a asset. In some periods, the
extraneous information must be correlated with fundamentals. Lastly, agents must be suﬃciently
aggressive in switching to superior performing strategies.
Mysticism cannot maintain a following indeﬁnitely given the existence of a minimum fraction
of fundamentalists δ2. If fundamentalism is eliminated from the population, then nt = 1 and the
payoﬀ to mysticism (10) is identical to the payoﬀ to reﬂectivism (9). However, the presence of a
minimum fraction of fundamentalists implies that nt < 1 and that the reﬂective and mystic forecasts
are not identical. Since the expected value of the covariance term UtAt−1 in (10) is zero, reﬂectivism
outperforms mysticism in the long run. Further, the magnitude of At grows over time, so the third
term in the payoﬀ to mysticism (10) dominates and the performance of mysticism deteriorates over
time. While mysticism can gain a following temporarily so the martingale aﬀects the asset price,
eventually agents abandon mysticism, so bubbles endogenously form and collapse. The goal of the
simulations is to determine to quantitative importance of such outbreaks of mysticism.
Since it limits the life of bubbles, the minimum fraction of fundamentalists plays a similar role
8as the projection facility used with least squares learning as in Adam, Marcet and Niccolini (2008).
In their approach, a representative agent updates the estimate of the parameters in a forecasting
rule, but the projection facility limits the acceptable estimates to those that produce non-explosive
behavior. The projection facility places stronger restrictions on agents beliefs than the minimum
fraction of fundamentalists. In the present model, a small fraction rejects extraneous information,
but under that projection facility, all agents have a sophisticated understanding of the long run
dynamics of the forecasting rule.
The model represents a minimal departure from rationality when mystics are introduced into
the population. Mysticism appears due to a disagreement about what constitutes fundamental
information, but all agents form expectations with a reasonable economic model, i.e. agents meet
the cognitive consistency principle described in Evans and Honkapohja (2010). Both mysticism and
fundamentalism satisfy rationality in the homogeneous case, and reﬂectivism satisﬁes rationality
when there is heterogeneity in the forecasting strategies, and this forecasting strategy is available
to agents at all times. When mystics are eliminated from the population, the reﬂective and
fundamental forecasts coincide and satisfy rationality. Only when mystics are introduced do the
mystic and fundamental forecasts deviate from rationality, but mystics believe that the extraneous
information in the martingale is relevant to the forecast of the asset price, and that other agents
will eventually realize this. Hence, all agents believe that they are making eﬃcient use of the
available information.
4 Simulations
Simulations of the model with the three forecasting strategies described above verify that outbreaks
of mysticism depend on the aggressiveness of the agents in switching to better performing strategies
and the magnitude of the shocks to the dividends and the martingale. Furthermore, for reason-
able parameterizations, when a signiﬁcant portion of the population adopts the mystic forecasting
strategy, there can be large bubble-like deviations in the asset price and price-dividend ratio.
Given the dividend dt and the martingale mt, the model is determined by the dynamic (12) along
with the exponential weighting function (13), the payoﬀs (9), (10) and (11), and the realization
of the asset price (6). The dividend process is speciﬁed as a stationary process with parameter
9choices below.







The constant d is chosen so that for α = 0.99, the steady state price-dividend ratio (log dif-
ference) is 20, which is close to the long run average for the S&P 500 from the Shiller data. The
persistence parameter ρ and shocks vt ∼ N (0,σv) are chosen to match values from the H-P de-
trended earnings series. Earnings are used instead of dividends, since not all ﬁrms pay dividends
and earnings are a more reasonable proxy for ﬁrm proﬁtability.
Two other ﬁxed parameters are the minimum fraction of fundamentalists δ2 = 0.01 and the
fraction of mystics introduced into the population 0.001. The minimum fraction of mystics is
set much smaller so that the introduction of mystics on its own does not have a quantitatively
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the asset price (6) since nt is small. If the dynamic used in the simulations
is speciﬁed so that if the unconstrained dynamic (12) sets one of the fractions below its minimum,
that fraction is set to its minimum, and the other two strategies split the remaining followers in
the same proportion they would in the unconstrained case. If mysticism falls below its minimum,
that level of followers is reintroduced and the martingale is restarted at mt = 0.
The free parameters θ, which measures agent aggressiveness, and ση, the standard deviation
of the martingale innovations, play are large role in determining the potential for outbreaks of
mysticism and bubbles. For those events to occur, agents must be suﬃciently aggressive, meaning
θ is suﬃciently large, and the magnitude of the martingale innovations must be large enough to
have a noticeable impact on the payoﬀs and the asset price, but not so large so that the third term
in the payoﬀ to mysticism (11) dominates.
Figures 1-5 demonstrate the role of the parameters θ and ση in determining the frequency
and duration of bubbles. Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of the price dividend ratio, the
forecast errors of the reﬂective and fundamental forecasts and the fraction of followers of the three
10forecasting strategies for two diﬀerent choices of θ. In ﬁgure 1, this parameter is set to θ = 5/8,
which indicates sluggish adjustment to strategies with superior performance. The simulations are
initiated at a point where the fraction of followers of reﬂectivism, the potentially dominant strategy,
is at its maximum. For the low level of θ, the introduction of a small fraction of mystics does
not induce others to adopt the strategy and has no appreciable impact on the evolution of the
asset price. Again, for smaller θ’s, the dynamic (12) approaches the linear weighting case where
reﬂectivism dominates.
Figure 2 shows the same variables as Figure 1, but for a higher level of θ at θ = 5.0. Here,
agents are suﬃciently aggressive for mysticism to gain a following for signiﬁcant stretches of time.
There are a number of instances where well over half of the the population is using mysticism and
some of these are associated with large fundamentalist forecast errors and large deviations from
the steady state value in the price-dividend ratio. Note that the martingale does not damage the
reﬂectivist forecast error, since reﬂectivists use the martingale and information about its relative
popularity in their forecast.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the role of the standard deviation of the martingale innovations ση
in the formation and duration of bubbles. The agent aggression parameter is set to θ = 5.0 as
in Figure 2, but the parameter ση is lower at ση = 0.25σv. Hence, though mysticism often gains
a following, it is more diﬃcult for the martingale to attain a suﬃcient magnitude to noticeably
aﬀect the asset price. However, when they do occur, bubbles in the asset price tend to last longer,
since the martingale grows relatively slowly and more time is required for the martingale (third
term) in the mystic payoﬀ (11) to overwhelm the covariance term. Conversely, a higher magnitude
for martingale innovation, as in Figure 4 with ση = 2.0σv, shows that bubble outbreaks become
rare and short-lived as the martingale quickly, if not immediately, grows too large for mysticism to
dominate.
Finally, Figure 5 shows the case where the agent aggression parameter is large at θ = 10.0, while
the parameter ση = σv as in Figures 1 and 2. Here, the martingale innovations are at a magnitude
where mysticism can dominate and the agents are quickly switching to superior strategies means
that the dynamics are dominated by the covariance term in the payoﬀs to mysticism (11) and
fundamentalism (10), and there is little inertia in the evolution of the xi,t’s. Hence, mysticism
quickly gains a following with a positive covariance, but quickly loses is with the opposite. There
11are some occurrences of bubble-like behavior in the price-dividend ratio, but the primary impact
of the martingale is an increase in the volatility of the asset price. We proceed by examining more
formal econometric features of the data to support these qualitative observations.
5 Time Series Tests
The simulated data matches econometric features of asset market data in multiple respects. In
the presence of bubbles, the price-dividend ratio has greater persistence than the dividend series.
Returns are unpredictable in the short run. Excess variance in the price-dividend ratio and ARCH
eﬀects in the returns can arise in the presence of bubbles arising due to outbreaks of mysticism.
The stationarity of the price-dividend ratio is diﬃcult to characterize, but this is true of stock
market data as well.
5.1 Mystic dominance and bubbles
Simple measures to detect mysticism and bubbles allow a demonstration of the correspondence
between the impact of the martingale and formal econometric features of the data such as excess
variance. We run 10,000 trials of 100 periods, roughly the size of the sample in the Shiller data, with
50 periods for initiation. Table 1 reports the fraction of periods (across all trials) where mysticism
dominated, i.e. when the fraction of followers of mysticism is greater than 0.5. Table 2 reports
the fraction of trials with an occurrence of a bubble in the asset price, deﬁned as a price-dividend
ratio that 50% greater than its steady state value. This is a necessarily arbitrary but rather strict
interpretation of a bubble. Observing the major U.S. stock market averages and using a steady
state ratio of 20, the price-earnings ratio in the Shiller data only exceeded 30 after the start of the
"technology bubble" of 2000. In the present model of a bubble, a negative bubble, when prices
fall below their fundamental value, are just as likely as positive bubbles. If both classes of bubbles
are included, the values in Table 2 should be doubled.
Tables 1 and 2 verify that outbreaks of mysticism and bubbles require suﬃciently large choices
for the parameter θ, the measure of agent aggressiveness, and the parameter ση the standard
deviation of the shocks to the martingale. For low values of these parameters, there are no
occurrences of bubbles or mystic dominance.
12As the choices of the parameters θ and ση become very large, the occurrences of bubbles
and mystic dominance fall from their maximum values. For example in Table 1 given θ = 3/4,
the fraction of mystic dominance initially rises with ση to a maximum of 0.188 at ση = 1.0,
corresponding to Figure 2, but falls for larger magnitudes of the shock to the martingale for two
reasons. For large ση, the martingale (third) term in the payoﬀ to mysticism (11) dominates,
diminishing the payoﬀ and making the emergence of mysticism more diﬃcult, as shown in Figure
4. Second, for large θ and ση, bubble rise and collapse faster, lowering the number of periods
satisfying the criteria for mystic dominance and bubbles, as in Figure 5.
If agents are suﬃciently aggressive about switching to superior strategies, θ ≥ 3/4, the role of the
martingale becomes signiﬁcant. In these cases, the fraction of periods showing mystic dominance
is always greater than the fraction with bubbles. Even if mysticism has a large following, the
magnitude of the martingale may not be large enough to have a dramatic eﬀect on the asset
price, pointing up the diﬃculty identifying bubbles. It is possible that agents are always using
extraneous information to value assets, but that information only drives asset prices away from
their fundamental values on rare occasions.
5.2 Persistence and volatility
For parameter settings that produce outbreaks of mysticism and bubbles, the simulated price-
dividend series displays greater persistence than the dividend series and matches the volatility
observed in the Shiller data. Tables 3 reports the average autocorrelation coeﬃcient across the
10,000 trials and demonstrates higher persistence for values of θ and ση where bubbles can arise.
While the highest value in the table of 0.62 does not show the persistence in the annual data of 0.8,
Table 4 reports the standard deviation of the autocorrelation coeﬃcients over the trials and shows
that such levels of persistence do occur in a number of trials. Interestingly, for high values of θ
and ση, the persistence falls to low levels as mysticism is adopted and abandoned very quickly as in
Figure 5. Table 5 reports the standard deviation of the price-dividend series, and for suﬃciently
large θ and ση the volatility matches the standard deviation in the Shiller data of 0.38.
135.3 Return Predictability
For a large majority of the simulated series, returns are not predictable in the short run, an
implication of the weak version of the EMH. We examine whether the price-dividend ratio is
informative about per share excess returns
Zt = dt + yt − α−1yt−1, (14)
which is the part of the optimization problem underlying the asset pricing model (2), see Brock
and Hommes (1998). Furthermore, per share excess returns are the same as the reﬂective forecast
up to a constant such that Ut = Zt + C, where C is the constant risk premium in (2), see Parke
and Waters (2007) for a discussion.
To test predictability, the following equation to test whether lagged prices dividend ratios
contain information about current returns, similar to those used in Fama and French (1988), is
estimated on simulated data with 100 observations.
Ut = β0 + β1 (pt−k − dt−k),
where k is the lead time for the prediction. If the R2 from the estimation is over 0.1, returns are
deﬁned to be predictable. Table 6 reports the fraction of runs with predictable returns, and, for a
lead time of two years k = 2, less than two percent of the series had predictable returns. Returns
at longer horizons are also unpredictable, which is unsurprising give the stationarity of the dividend
process.
5.4 Price-dividend stationarity
The the potential presence of the martingale has an ambiguous impact on the stationarity of the
price-dividend ratio. Given the stationary process for dividends above, the price-dividend ratio
should be stationary according to the strong EMH, i.e. the martingale-free solution. Formerly,
a stationary price-dividend ratio was considered to be a stylized fact of ﬁnancial markets data
(Cochrane 2001), but inclusion of data from the past decade shows a non-stationary price-dividend
ratio, though not for the price-earnings ratio in the Shiller series. A Dickey-Fuller test at a sig-
14niﬁcance level of 5% is performed on the simulated series with 100 observations. Table 7 reports
the fraction of trials where the stationarity of pt − dt is rejected. For the cases where mysticism
does not arise, stationarity of the price-dividend ratios cannot be rejected, which is not surprising,
given the moderate amount of persistence in the dividend process (ρ = 0.5). However, there are
simulations with a non-stationary price-dividend ratio, but the presence of bubbles is a necessary
but not suﬃcient condition for non-stationarity. Comparing Tables 2 and 4, the fraction of trials
with a bubble in the price-dividend ratio is always larger than the fraction where that ratio is non-
stationary. The presence of bubbles is a necessary but insuﬃcient condition for non-stationarity
of the price-dividend ratio.
The presence of mysticism can have econometrically detectable eﬀects on the data similar to
those found in asset markets. In particular, for parameter choices where mysticism can gain a
signiﬁcant following, there is excess variance in the asset price, and ARCH eﬀects in the returns.
5.5 Excess Variance
Studies such as Shiller (1981) demonstrate that asset prices ﬂuctuate more than predicted by the
EMH, and endogenous rational bubbles can explain such excess variance . Simulations determine
a ratio of the realized variance and the predicted variance based on the variance of the dividends
and the EMH, though the statistical signiﬁcance is diﬃcult to assess. A statistical test of the
variance of the price-dividend ratio provides more deﬁnitive evidence.
In the absence of mysticism (nt = 0), the asset price behaves according to the strong version of
















Hence, the variance of the asset price should be σ2
y∗ = (1 − αρ)
−2 σ2
d. Table 8 reports the ratio
σ2
y/σ2
y∗ of the variance of the simulated asset prices and the predicted variance using the variance
of the simulated dividends. Under the strong EMH, the ratio is unity, which occurs for very low
levels of θ and ση. For higher levels, the ratio rises above one, and, for one pair of parameter
values well over three. This level is much smaller than Shiller’s initial estimate of 20, but other
15research3 has found smaller estimated values.
To examine the statistical signiﬁcance of the observed excess volatility in the asset prices, we
conduct a test on a transformation of the price-dividend ratio. Let the notation ￿ x denote the




￿ yt − ￿ dt
￿
has the standard
normal distribution so the variance of ￿ pdt is distributed χ2 (n)/n where n is the number of periods.
Table 9 reports the fraction of runs such that the variance of the realized ￿ pdt is excessive at a
signiﬁcance level of 0.05. The results demonstrate that the excess variance shown in Table 8 is
statistically signiﬁcant and corresponds to outbreaks of bubbles. The pattern of the excess return
probabilities in Table 9 follows that of the probability an occurrence of a bubble in Table 9 with
higher probabilities in every case. For example, for a suﬃciently large choice of θ such that θ ≥ 3/2,
both probabilities rise with the magnitude of the martingale innovation ση for all values reported,
but for smaller choice of θ, the probabilities both peak at a choice of ση less than 16.
5.6 ARCH
Tests for ARCH eﬀects similarly show a correspondence with bubbles and excess volatility. To test
for ARCH, we regress the squared excess returns4 (14) on four lags of itself and a constant using
least squares. Table 10 reports the fraction of runs where the F-test rejects the restriction that all
the coeﬃcients on the lagged squared returns are zero at a signiﬁcance level of 0.05. For low levels
of the parameters θ and ση, there are no ARCH eﬀects above those produced at random, but, for
higher levels, ARCH eﬀects are evident. Thought the magnitude of values in the table are not as
high as one might expect, this is primarily due to the short sample in the trials. Much greater
incidence of ARCH and GARCH is found for longer samples and a diﬀerent calibration in Parke
and Waters (2007).
For a given standard deviation of the martingale innovations ση, the relationship between the
frequency of signiﬁcant ARCH eﬀects and the aggressiveness of the agents (θ) is similar to the
pattern with mystic dominance and bubbles in Tables (1) and (2). ARCH, mystic dominance
and bubbles all rise with θ but fall for higher levels. However, the correspondence is not perfect,
since the peak levels of ARCH are typically at θ = 10, but the peak levels for mystic dominance
3Some examples areLeRoy and Porter (1979), Campbell and Shiller (1989) and LeRoy and Parke (1992).
4ARCH eﬀects are even more evident using the alternative deﬁnition for returns (Pt + Dt − Pt−1)/Pt−1, but in
this cases there are ARCH eﬀect in simulations with no bubbles, so the focus on excess returns is more revealing.
16typically occur at lower levels of θ. For a given level of θ, there is positive relationship between
the magnitude of the shocks to the martingale ση and the frequency of ARCH. This relationship
corresponds to the relationship between the magnitude ση and mystic dominance and bubbles for
low levels of ση but not for high levels. Even small fractions of agents adopting mysticism can
aﬀect the data when the magnitude of the martingale is large.
The behavior of the simulated time series of the endogenous rational bubbles model matches
multiple features found with stock price and dividend data. As expected given stationary dividends,
returns are not predictable. It is possible though not necessarily true that bubbles lead to non-
stationarity in the price-dividend ratio. The presence of statistically signiﬁcant levels of excess
variance, and ARCH eﬀects corresponds to outbreaks of mysticism and bubbles.
5.7 Extensions
There are a number of avenues for further research involving alternative approaches to the under-
lying dividend process, the inclusion of parameter learning and the evolutionary dynamic. In the
present paper, the dividend process is stationary, but allowing for trend growth, leading to growth
in the asset price as well, is more realistic. Modeling dividends as a random walk with drift as in
Adam, Marcet and Niccolini (2008) and LeBaron (2010), should produce predictability of returns
in the long run as has been reported in the data, for example Cochrane (2001). The proper method
for modeling the martingale in the mystic forecast in such an environment is a non-trivial question
requiring further research. Once one includes growth in dividends and prices, introducing para-
meter learning becomes appealing. Of course, in an environment with heterogenous agents, there
are a number of possible ways to model such updating, but that fact does not make the issue less
worthy of exploration. Lastly, there are a number of alternatives, such as multinomial logit (Brock
and Hommes 1998) and the Brown, von Neumann and Nash dynamic (see Waters 2009), to the
weighted replicator dynamic in the present work, see Sandholm (2010) for a theoretical overview
of the alternatives.
176 Conclusion
Models of asset pricing where a representative agent forms expectations according to the strong
eﬃcient markets hypothesis violates both the heterogeneity of forecasts and reality of bubble-
like behavior, as well as some formal econometric features of asset market data. The model
with mysticism includes heterogeneous forecasting strategies in a way that satisﬁes the cognitive
consistency principle, describes the necessary conditions for bubbles, and explains excess volatility
in asset prices, ARCH eﬀects in returns and other aspects of the data. This model is one of a
number of approaches to asset pricing involving minimal deviations from rationality that make it
possible to explain the complex behavior of these markets in a disciplined way.
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θ = 5/8, ση = σv x 1.0






























θ = 5.0, ση = σv x 1.0






























θ = 5.0, ση = σv x 0.25






























θ = 5.0, ση = σv x 2.0






























θ = 10.0, ση = σv x 1.0
24ση = 0.23 x 
1/8 1/4 1/2 1 2 4 8
5/8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
5/4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0001
5/2 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.020 0.025 0.006 0.0014
θ 5 0.044 0.107 0.154 0.120 0.050 0.016 0.0054
10 0.037 0.094 0.177 0.181 0.117 0.059 0.0298
20 0.021 0.070 0.132 0.150 0.109 0.062 0.0334
40 0.025 0.067 0.105 0.107 0.075 0.044 0.0236
Table 1
The fraction of periods over all runs where the mysticism exceeds 50% (x2 > 0.5)
ση = 0.23 x 
1/8 1/4 1/2 1 2 4 8
5/8 0.122 0.138 0.124 0.165 0.186 0.261 0.550
5/4 0.130 0.149 0.135 0.154 0.197 0.230 0.480
5/2 0.116 0.133 0.161 0.234 0.271 0.287 0.275
θ 5 0.177 0.257 0.362 0.464 0.493 0.468 0.361
10 0.114 0.221 0.548 0.830 0.938 0.933 0.882
20 0.122 0.122 0.192 0.567 0.879 0.928 0.909
40 0.100 0.118 0.141 0.337 0.716 0.830 0.841
Table 2
The fraction of runs with one period where pt − dt > ln2 +
￿
  p −   d
￿
25ση = 0.23 x 
1/8 1/4 1/2 1 2 4 8
5/8 0.432 0.440 0.437 0.432 0.412 0.374 0.275
5/4 0.436 0.434 0.442 0.433 0.415 0.381 0.302
5/2 0.441 0.451 0.467 0.493 0.487 0.427 0.384
θ 5 0.479 0.535 0.610 0.620 0.519 0.397 0.355
10 0.468 0.503 0.573 0.562 0.403 0.254 0.149
20 0.432 0.435 0.453 0.417 0.308 0.193 0.118
40 0.431 0.429 0.428 0.380 0.303 0.231 0.150
Table 3
The average across all trials of the one lag autocorrelation coeﬃcient
ση = 0.23 x 
1/8 1/4 1/2 1 2 4 8
5/8 0.092 0.091 0.094 0.089 0.092 0.095 0.097
5/4 0.092 0.087 0.091 0.093 0.097 0.096 0.099
5/2 0.094 0.103 0.125 0.169 0.188 0.154 0.142
θ 5 0.123 0.170 0.209 0.211 0.189 0.167 0.164
10 0.093 0.105 0.128 0.135 0.151 0.167 0.169
20 0.087 0.090 0.093 0.104 0.121 0.131 0.131
40 0.089 0.089 0.092 0.098 0.111 0.123 0.120
Table 4
The standard deviation across all trials of the one lag autocorrelation coeﬃcient.
26ση = 0.23 x 
1/8 1/4 1/2 1 2 4 8
5/8 0.230 0.232 0.234 0.237 0.239 0.250 0.286
5/4 0.230 0.230 0.235 0.236 0.240 0.247 0.303
5/2 0.231 0.235 0.289 0.544 0.662 0.405 0.314
θ 5 0.250 0.321 0.523 0.575 0.428 0.319 0.305
10 0.237 0.255 0.316 0.373 0.387 0.414 0.485
20 0.230 0.235 0.254 0.289 0.328 0.386 0.499
40 0.229 0.231 0.240 0.256 0.285 0.333 0.430
Table 5
The standard deviation of the price-dividend ratio.
27ση = 0.23 x 
1/8 1/4 1/2 1 2 4 8
5/8 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001
5/4 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
5/2 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.009 0.013
θ 5 0.001 0.004 0.009 0.012 0.004 0.007 0.012
10 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
20 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003
40 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 6
The fraction of runs with predictable returns.
ση = 0.23 x 
1/8 1/4 1/2 1 2 4 8
5/8 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
5/4 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999
5/2 1.000 0.998 0.976 0.923 0.906 0.969 0.996
θ 5 0.989 0.927 0.794 0.784 0.931 0.995 0.995
10 1.000 0.998 0.974 0.992 0.999 1.000 1.000
20 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
40 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table 7
The fraction of runs with a stationary price-dividend ratio.
28ση = 0.23 x 
1/8 1/4 1/2 1 2 4 8
5/8 1.006 1.012 1.020 1.030 1.038 1.053 1.127
5/4 1.007 1.012 1.021 1.031 1.037 1.046 1.162
5/2 1.010 1.020 1.137 1.946 2.478 1.442 1.186
θ 5 1.050 1.208 1.888 2.129 1.519 1.198 1.159
10 1.027 1.073 1.237 1.389 1.416 1.486 1.734
20 1.007 1.022 1.063 1.149 1.231 1.401 1.784
40 1.002 1.007 1.024 1.065 1.123 1.240 1.529
Table 8
The ratio V ar(y∗
t)/V ar(yt) for each run.
ση = 0.23 x 
1/8 1/4 1/2 1 2 4 8
5/8 0.360 0.422 0.418 0.481 0.508 0.699 0.986
5/4 0.354 0.350 0.447 0.483 0.553 0.670 0.955
5/2 0.348 0.376 0.480 0.559 0.557 0.486 0.529
θ 5 0.456 0.593 0.682 0.720 0.702 0.626 0.542
10 0.478 0.721 0.921 0.992 0.991 0.994 0.988
20 0.332 0.459 0.804 0.966 0.994 0.997 0.999
40 0.341 0.373 0.555 0.801 0.929 0.983 0.996
Table 9
The fraction of runs with excess variance
29ση = 0.23 x 
1/8 1/4 1/2 1 2 4 8
5/8 0.028 0.040 0.028 0.037 0.026 0.05 0.043
5/4 0.022 0.026 0.040 0.051 0.032 0.049 0.074
5/2 0.033 0.035 0.046 0.053 0.158 0.172 0.136
θ 5 0.039 0.059 0.079 0.177 0.410 0.411 0.264
10 0.035 0.026 0.046 0.129 0.320 0.435 0.39
20 0.038 0.048 0.036 0.063 0.193 0.323 0.349
40 0.040 0.027 0.037 0.051 0.180 0.291 0.294
Table 10
The fraction of runs with signiﬁcant ARCH eﬀects.
30